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party. For better or worse, Taiwan’s democracy is completely homegrown.
To evaluate how Taiwan’s democracy
and the Sino-U.S. Cold War diplomacy
impacts relations today, Bush discusses
the four diplomatic communiqués and
congressional acts that have regulated
U.S.-PRC-Taiwanese relations, including the Shanghai communiqué (1972),
the U.S.-PRC normalization communiqué (1978), the Taiwan Relations Act
(1979), and the U.S.-PRC communiqué
on arms sales to Taiwan (1982). The
commitments included in these four
“sacred texts” were not trivial and have
created fixed constraints on Washington’s
and Beijing’s behavior. Although necessary to defeat the Soviets, these diplomatic agreements have often worked to
the PRC’s advantage in putting diplomatic pressure on Taiwan to accept its
“one country, two systems” formula.
As for what will happen in the future to
this “one China” conundrum, Bush
cautions that Taiwan’s recent democratic reforms have not given twelve
million voting Taiwanese their own seat
at the table in any future cross-strait
talks leading to Chinese reunification.
Democracy will make any satisfactory
political solution of the PRC-Taiwan
divide even more difficult to negotiate.
He cautions, therefore, that the “Taiwan and China positions are sufficiently at odds that they cannot be
papered over. If the stalemate is to be
broken peacefully, either Beijing will
have to abandon one country, two systems, or Taipei will have to accept it.”
Since neither of these options appears
likely, one is forced to conclude that
PRC-Taiwan reunification can only be
accomplished as a result of war.
BRUCE ELLEMAN

Naval War College
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Goldman, Emily O., and Leslie C. Eliason, eds. The
Diffusion of Military Technology and Ideas. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford Univ. Press, 2003. 415pp. $75

This book offers a rich collection of research papers on very important topics: the much discussed revolution in
military affairs (RMA), and the less discussed diffusions of new military technology and the accompanying changes
in military doctrine to other countries.
The authors were carefully chosen experts in history, political science, and
sociology, who address the very important factors of national culture as they
affect the application of new military
technologies.
The product of a series of workshops,
this work owes a considerable debt to
the prodding of Andrew Marshall, Director of Net Assessment in the Office
of the Secretary of Defense, who has
been encouraging scholarly analysis of
the full implications of the RMA.
Although recognizing the ambiguities
relating to the exact definition of such a
“revolution,” the book does not get
bogged down in the debate, but rather
directs its analysis to the sociological,
cultural, bureaucratic, intellectual, and
other processes by which such revolutions are, or are not, replicated. Military
weapons may spread through arms
sales, the commercial development of
“dual-use” technologies, or by simple
imitation, but the military doctrines appropriate to such new kinds of weaponry
sometimes do not spread so rapidly.
There are some very stimulating and
provocative historical case studies, including the foreign penetrations of the
past five centuries into South Asia, the
development of “blitzkrieg” armored
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warfare in World War II, aircraft carriers, and the Soviet impact on Arab armies (Soviet tanks were delivered, but
Soviet doctrine was not adopted). More
recent examples include the Soviet
approach to managing the Warsaw
Pact, the “special relationship” that
has existed since 1945 among Englishspeaking democracies, and the patterns
of nuclear proliferation and the spread
of information technology.
This work is directed to both the social
scientist and the policy practitioner.
The chapters are well written and rich
in detail, with excellent footnotes, thus
making this a handy volume for anyone
doing research in these areas.
There are times when the unifying
theme of the diffusion of “technology
and ideas” becomes so broad that it
seems to include everything militarily
that has happened or that is going to
happen, for what else is there to a strategic confrontation but the weapons
owned and how they will be used? Yet
this work brings the subject into
sharper focus, revealing how ideas
about the appropriate use of weapons
do not always travel as well as the weapons themselves. The introductory outline thus helps to maintain that focus,
and the concluding chapter by Emily
Goldman and Andrew Ross is extremely
valuable for sifting out the recurring
patterns that emerge from the evidence
presented.
Among the important conclusions
mentioned are that transformation
leaders do not long monopolize their
transformations; leaders are frequently
surpassed by followers; leadership effecting a military transformation is no
guarantee of victory; and wholesale replications of the innovations of a transformation may not be necessary. Most
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central to this work is the finding that
“software”(ideas and doctrine) does not
travel as well as “hardware” (physical
weapons). The explanation for this last
limitation is the basic theme of the entire book.
Collections of conference papers often
do not hang together well, or when they
do, they typically do not wander far
enough away from a simple theme. This
book suffers from neither drawback,
being rich and eclectic in the materials
it offers, yet at the same time remaining
focused on an important set of questions. It offers a great deal for anyone
concerned with the military-technology
revolution.
GEORGE H. QUESTER

University of Maryland

Record, Jeffrey. Making War, Thinking History.
Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2002.
216pp. $28.95

Jeffrey Record is professor of strategy
and international security at the Air
War College, Maxwell Air Force Base.
He is the author of four books and numerous monographs on U.S. military
strategy and has extensive Capitol Hill
experience, including service as a professional staffer for the Senate Armed
Services Committee.
This work assesses how the experiences
of Munich and Vietnam influenced
presidential decisions on the use of
force in every administration from
Harry Truman to Bill Clinton. Both
Munich and Vietnam are regularly invoked in current political debate in an
attempt to justify a viewpoint, especially since the Cold War foreign policy
consensus has broken down in recent
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